Jane Wensley and David Flaherty as they exit the U.S. District Court in Springfield with paralegal Michelle Llosa and attorney Luke Ryan yesterday after a hearing in their case against Mayor Daniel Knapik. (Photo by Carl E. Hartdegen)
SPRINGFIELD – U.S. District Court Judge Michael A. Ponsor rejected summary motions from both side of the case in which Mayor Daniel M. Knapik is alleged to have violated the civil rights of At-large City Councilor David A. Flaherty and Municipal Light Board member Jane C. Wensley by ordering the removal of their campaign signs the day before municipal elections in November of 2012.
Ponsor’s opening remarks were interesting in that they may reflect the final resolution of the case pitting attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union, representing Flaherty, Wensley and David Costa, a Russell resident who owns property on East Silver Street, and Springfield attorney Edward M. Pikula representing Knapik.
“I’m kind of puzzled by this case,” Ponsor began. “A sign went up, was removed, then four hours later was put up again.”
“This is a situation where there seems to be a little bit of tension between the parties,” Ponsor said. “I’m struggling to see how things got this far” in the litigation process.
“The tension is both political and personal between Flaherty and Knapik,” Ponsor said. “They were in different camps politically. There isn’t much dispute of the political tension between Flaherty and Knapik.”
Ponsor then addressed “disputed issues of fact” made by the attorneys in support of their “theories” presented to decide this case.
Ponsor noted that the ACLU team, attorney Luke Ryan of the Sasson, Turnbull, Ryan & Hoose law firm, and Attorney William C. Newman of the ACLU Western Regional Office in Northampton, argue that while the political signs of Flaherty, Wensley and At-large Councilor John J. Beltrandi, who is not a party to the civil suit, were removed, a real estate sign was left standing in the same area.
The ACLU argues that was because Knapik’s order to the Department of Public Works was selective and relative to only the political signs.
“Which raises the motive of the defendant (Knapik) in ordering the signs removed because of the political tension (with Flaherty),” Ponsor said. “Exactly how much relief (is justified) for a few hours (between the signs being removed and then being replaced). So that is where I would like to leave my preliminary remarks.”
“It is easy to be patronizing, to see a tempest in a teapot, unless you’re in the teapot,” Ponsor said. “But it does seem to me to be a tempest in a teapot.”
Pikula argued that the ACLU case is a “claim of the nature (that) almost trivializes the constitution.”
“A close review of the facts relying on if there was an ulterior motive,” Pikula said. “That’s what it amounts to here.”
Pikula said the plaintiff’s case is assembled on a string of assertions that do not hold together when scrutinized.
Ponsor summed it up as “more foam then beer.”
Pikula said the campaign signs were on public property and that the plaintiffs had “no constitutional right to do so.”
Pikula also offered the argument that the city, and entire region, was still recovering from the Halloween snowstorm that knocked out power for days for most residents and that the storm forced the city to declare a state of emergency and to cancel trick-or-treating which was rescheduled for Monday, Nov. 7, the day on which the signs were removed.
Pikula said that Knapik acted to remove “a potential hazard to trick-or-treaters” that would be out that evening because the signs, located between Lindbergh Boulevard and Cross Street interfered with the line of sight of both motorists and pedestrians.
Ryan argued that that At-large City Council race was “hotly contested” and that Flaherty “received permission to put his signs up at an advantageous location, which happened to be across the street from the mayor’s personal domicile and could be seen through the picture window.”
The Wensley sign, put up by City Councilor Mary O’Connell, was up for days if not a month” before it was removed and that Beltrandi’s sign was also up on Lindbergh Boulevard for some time prior to being removed.”
Ryan contended that it was the erection of the Flaherty sign which “triggered removal” of all of the political signs.
“The mayor had never exercised that authority (prior to Nov. 7) and did not exercise it any place else in the city,” Ryan said. “There is not a compelling public safety issue.
“This may look like small potatoes, but a wrong was committed,” Ryan said. “We’re fighting about principles.”
Ponsor said that if that were the argument offered by the plaintiffs, they would “then lose summary judgment” and asked Ryan to make a case for that summary judgment.
Ryan argued that the city’s sign ordinance, sponsored by Flaherty and approved by the City Council just prior to the election campaign season, allowed signs within the lot line.
“Six of the seven signs were within the lot line,” Ryan said.
“That gets you to the defendant messed up, but it doesn’t get you to constitutional discretion,” Ponsor responded.
“Speech has been diminished or infringed upon,” Ryan said. “A harm has occurred. There was motive to diminish the speech of a particular point of view.”
Ryan argued that the case is about content desecration because a real estate sign was not also removed and that the action involved only political signs.
Pikula countered that neither of the ACLU arguments “is a winner” and that it is a long-standing practice across the state to remove signs from the tree belt.
“There were signs all across the city,” Pikula said. The removal “was limited to a small area because that is whet (Knapik) observed, and deemed to be a hazard that could be a liability to the city.”
Pikula said there is also a reasonable explanation for the fact that the real estate sign was left standing in the same area.
Knapik did “not see the real estate sign because (it was hidden by all of the) political signs,” Pikula said. “nor did (Knapik) order that all of the Flaherty signs in the city be removed.”
The discussion then moved to the next step in the litigation process with both sides agreeing for the need to step back and reopen the discovery phase of the case.
Ponsor also discussed which vehicle would be used if the case does move to trial. The three options are a jury trial as requested by the plaintiffs, a non-jury trial in which Ponsor would make the final decision or a trial with an “advisory jury” to assist Ponser in coming to a judgment.
The hour-long hearing concluded after a lengthy sidebar between Ponser and the attorneys. The ACLU team then took Flaherty and Wensley, who were both present in the courtroom, into a conference room to discuss options as the case proceeds.
